We present a regularization method to approach a solution of the pessimistic formulation of ill -posed bilevel problems . This allows to overcome the difficulty arising from the non uniqueness of the lower level problems solutions and responses. We prove existence of approximated solutions, give convergence result using Hoffman-like assumptions. We end with objective value error estimates.
Introduction
Bilevel programming problems are of growing interest both from theoretical and practical points of view. These models are used in various applications, such as economic planning, network design, and so on... This large class of important and strategic economic problems can be viewed as static noncooperative asymmetric games. Two players seek to optimize their individual objective functions. The first player (the leader) must take into account the reaction (or any possible reaction when non unique) of the second player (the follower). Such a problem can be ill posed since the lower level ( follower's problem ) may have many solutions and responses for every (or some) fixed leader's variables. In the so-called "optimistic case ", many optimal reactions of the follower are possible and the follower is assumed to choose in favor of the leader. In this case, the upper level problem can be modelled using a bilevel formulation. These programs are quite difficult nonconvex optimization problems. Several theoretical results and heuristics or approximation techniques can be found in the recent literature [6, 10, 11, 5, 7, 12, 14] . In some of these works, strong assumptions are made to simplify the model. The solution of the lower level is supposed to be unique or if they are many, they provide the same (unique) upper level objective value.
The lower level is replaced by the equivalent first order optimality conditions and can be viewed as an equilibrium problem. Most of time, the complementarity part of these optimality conditions is smoothed or penalized using different techniques.
In our approach we consider the realistic situation where different reactions of the follower are possible. There are multiple responses and we consider the so-called "pessimistic" formulation of the asymmetric game. This can be interpreted as a kind of non-cooperative asymmetric game Throughout this paper, we shall consider the general bi-level problem:
(P) max f (y, x) y ∈ K , x ∈ S(y) ,
where K and C are non empty convex, closed, bounded subsets of R n and S(y) = argmin { h(y, z) |z ∈ C }, (1.1)
f and h are smooth functions from R n × R m to R. Moreover, for every y ∈ K, f (y, ·)
and h(y, ·) are convex and f takes only positive values ( assumptions will be made more precise later).
Remark 1.1 Since the upper-level objective function f has to be maximized, one can
suppose it (without loss of generality) to be positive. Indeed, f can be replaced by
2 for some y 0 ∈ K and x 0 ∈ S(y 0 ) .
As mentionned before, the main difficulty comes from the fact that the cost "function"
f (y, x) , x ∈ S(y) can be a multivalued application whenever the lower level set is not unique and distinct solutions yield distinct upper-level objective function values. In addition, it is not clear that f (y, x) = f (y,x) for any x,x ∈ S(y). Therefore, it is difficult to compute the solutions (if there are any).
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the regularization method and give an existence result in next section. Section 3 is devoted to an asymptotic analysis: we prove that the cluster points of solutions to the penalized problems are solutions of a three-level limit problem corresponding to the " pessimistic" formulation of the considered ill-posed bilevel problems . We give some error estimates in the last section.
The penalized problem
We would like to let the upper level objective function single valued. So we are going to use a penalization process that allow to compute approximate solutions more easily. More precisely, ε > 0 being given, we consider the following penalized problem
where
For each nonnegative ε, the bi-level problem (P ε ) is well posed . Furthermore, under some general and non restrictive assumptions on f and h we will prove that the upper level function is single valued and continuous with respect to the leader variables y.
This regularization technique makes some selection property on the solutions of the lower level problem which is easy to characterize and have an explicit and simple economic interpretation. In almost all other regularization methods, the lower level is replaced by its optimality conditions. The bi-level problem is then considered as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints. The "hard" part of these constraints ( namely the complementarity conditions ) is then smoothed or penalized. In fact these methods make also some selection ( the generated sequences converge to the analytic center when using smoothing methods or the least norm center ) on the solution set of the lower level but these selections do not have any economic interpretation since they have no link to the objective function of the upper level. Moreover, convergence results need more restrictive assumptions.
For convenience of the reader, we first give or recall some direct and classical results.
These results will be useful for forthcoming developpements.
Lemma 2.1 For any ε > 0, the lower-level problem
Proof -The existence of a solution to Q ε,y is obvious since C is bounded and f, h are continuous. Moreover Q ε,y may be written as follows
Q
Since f takes only positive values, the equality constraint can be obviously replaced by an inequality in this minimization problem
Q * ε,y is a convex problem and the cost function is strictly convex with respect to t. This simple observation proves that the optimal value of t is unique and completes the proof. 
Proof -Let be x k ∈ S ε (y k ) ⊂ C. As C is bounded, then (x k ) is bounded as well and converges to some x (up to a subsequence). As x k ∈ S ε (y k ) we get
As f and h are continuous with respect to y and x we obtain
that is x ∈ S ε (y). 
is single-valued and continuous.
Proof -We see that the function v ε is single valued, with Lemma 2.1. Let us prove the continuity: let be (y k ) a sequence that converges to some y.
x k ∈ S ε (y k ). Lemma 2.2 yields that x k converges (up to a subsequence) to x ∈ S ε (y). As f is continuous with respect to y and x we get
2
We may now give an existence result :
Theorem 2.1 For any ε > 0, problem (P ε ) admits at least an optimal solution y ε .
Proof -As v ε is continuous and K is bounded, the result follows. 2
3 Asymptotic results 3.1 A convergence result for the solutions of (P ε )
In this subsection, we study the behaviour of solutions of (P ε ) as ε goes to 0. First, we introduce some notations:
where S(y) is given by (1.1) and
Note that problem ( P) is a three-level problem that can be written in an extended way as follows:
Lemma 3.2 Let y be fixed. If x ε ∈ S ε converges to somex, thenx ∈ S(y)
Proof -Assume x ε ∈ S ε and x ε →x as ε → 0. For every z ∈ C we get
When ε → 0, as the functions are continuous we obtain
that isx ∈ S(y).
Let bex ∈ C such that h(y,x) = h(y,x). Then
Passing to the limit with the continuity of f gives
With Lemma 3.1 we conclude that x ∈ S(y). 2
To establish the main convergence result of this work, we will use some technical but not so very restrictive assumption.
Let us set
and
Assume we can find σ o > 0 and ε o > 0 such that
This assumption does not seem quite natural at a first glimpse. In fact it a Hoffmaninequality type assumption which is more or less standard in this context. The proof of next theorem, and especially the proof of Lemma 3.3 below will make this hypothesis clear.
Theorem 3.1 Assume condition (3.5) is verified and let y ε an optimal solution to (P ε ).

Then y ε converges to someȳ (up to a subsequence) andȳ is an optimal solution to ( P).
Proof -Let y ε an optimal solution to (P ε ). Then y ε ∈ K which is bounded. So (extracting a subsequence) we may assert that y ε converges toȳ. As K is closed thenȳ ∈ K. As y ε is an optimal solution to (P ε ) we have
where x ε ∈ S ε (y ε ). Note thatx ε ∈ S ε (ỹ) implies thatx ε ∈ C. Sox ε is bounded and converges tox (up to a subsequence) withx ∈ S(ỹ) (Lemma 3.2).
Passing to the limit in (3.6) gives
wherex is the limit (of a subsequence) of x ε . Now we need the following result to achieve the proof :
Lemma 3.3 Assume that (3.5) is satisfied and let (y ε , x ε ∈ S ε (y ε )) converging to (ȳ,x).
Thenx ∈ S(ȳ).
Thanks to the definition of S(ỹ) we note that f (ỹ, ·) is constant on S(ỹ), namely
withx ∈ S(ȳ). This means thatȳ is an optimal solution to ( P).
• It remains to prove Lemma 3.3.
Let y ε converging toȳ and x ε ∈ S ε (y ε ). As x ε ∈ C (bounded) one may extract a subsequence converging tox. We are going to prove thatx ∈ S(ȳ).
We first prove thatx ∈ S(ȳ). As x ε ∈ S ε (y ε ) we have
as f and g are continuous, passing to the limit gives
Letx ∈ S(ȳ). Suppose for a while that ∃ε such that
We get
with relation (3.7) this gives
Asx ∈ C relation (3.7) yields as well
Adding these two relations gives
Passing to the limit gives finally
This means thatx ∈ S(ȳ).
Unfortunately, there is no reason for "assumption " (3.8) to be satisfied and we must get rid of it. We are going to adapt the previous proof (we gave the main ideas). Ifx / ∈ Λ ε then we perform a projection: we callx ε the projection ofx on Λ ε . We are going to show thatx ε converges tox.
Asx / ∈ Λ ε we get α ε < h(y ε ,x) . Let us call σ αε (h) the following real number
where d(x, Λ ε ) is the distance between x and Λ ε and
This so called Hoffman constant can be defined following for instance Azé and Corvellec [2] . Therefore
We have to estimate σ αε (h). In particular we look for σ o > 0 such that
In [2] , it is shown that
where |∇ x h(y ε , x)| stands for the strong slope of h at (y ε , x) with respect to x ([2]); the strong-slope of a function ϕ at x is defined as
Indeed y ε →ȳ, x ε →x, h is continuous and h(ȳ,x) = h(ȳ,x).
We may now end the proof. We can use relation (3.10) withx ε instead ofx so that
we choose z = x ε once again to get
Passing to the limit as ε → 0 gives (for everyx ∈ S(ȳ)
This means thatx ∈ S(ȳ). 2
Remark 3.1 It is clear that assumption (3.5) is satisfied if h is linear ("linear" case).
Next problem is to find simple conditions for (ȳ,x) to get (3.5) when h is not linear. One hint is to assume that h is C 1 and that ∇ x h(ȳ,x = 0; then the strong slope |∇ x h(y ε , x)| coincides with the norm ∇ x h(y ε , x) of the gradient of h with respect to x. With the convergence of (y ε , x ε ) to (ȳ,x) (up to a subsequence), there exist ε o and η > 0 such that
next we have to prove that ∇ x h(y ε , x) ≥ η for any x such that h(y ε , x) = α ε . A good tool could be an "local inversion theorem" for the multivalued case but it is not obvious.
The problem is still open. We have the same challenge in next section.
Comparison of (P) and ( P)
Now, it is clear that a solution of the penalized problem (P ε ) is a good approximation of a solution of ( P). Anyway, it is not a solution (a priori) of the problem in consideration (P). So we have to compare (P) and ( P).
The second level of ( P) clearly disappears when the initial problem lower level solutions set corresponds to the same revenue for each value of y (or are unique). In this case (P) and ( P) are equivalent. In other cases, the solution of ( P) corresponds to some "optimal worst" case solution.
This solution is still important for the decision makers of the upper level problem.
Remark 3.2 Using the same regularization technique, if we replace εf
in the definition of h ε , we will obtain (at the limit) an optimal solution of (P) which corresponds to an optimal best case solution of our asymmetric game .
Error estimates
The purpose of this section is to study the behavior of f (y * , x * ) − f (y ε , x ε ) as ε → 0 and provide (if possible) some error estimates. Since the penalized problems are nonconvex, we can not use any classical perturbation result. We proceed in two steps : we first prove some monotonicity results for the upper level objective function values and then consider classical perturbation analysis results for some auxilliary convex problems.
Preliminary results
Lemma 4.1 Let be ε > ε ′ > 0 and y ∈ K. Let be x ε ∈ S ε (y) andx ∈ S ε ′ (y). Then we get
Proof -Let us fix ε > ε ′ > 0 and choose some y ∈ K. Let be x ε ∈ S ε (y) andx ∈ S ε ′ (y).
Assume that
Asx ∈ S ε ′ (y) and x ε ∈ C, we have
With (4.1) and ε > ε ′ > 0, we obtain
and we get a contradiction. 2 Lemma 4.2 Let be ε > ε ′ > 0 and y ε (respectively y ε ′ ) a solution to (P ε ) (respectively (P ε ′ )). Let be x ε ∈ S ε (y ε ) and x ε ′ ∈ S ε ′ (y ε ′ ). Then
where y * is a solution to ( P) with x * ∈ S(y * ).
Proof -Using Lemma 4.1 with y = y ε and x ε ∈ S ε (y ε ) gives
As y ε ′ is a solution of (P ε ′ ) we get
We may choose in particular y = y ε and x =x ∈ S ε ′ (y ε ) to get
As f is assumed to be nonnegative we finally obtain
Therefore the family (f (y ε , x ε ) is increasing). The convergence of f (y ε , x ε ) to f (y * , x * ) (f is continuous) achieves the proof since f (y * , x * ) is the limit and the upper bound of the family (f (y ε , x ε )) . 2 Lemma 4.3 Let be ε > 0 andx ε ∈ S ε (y * ) where y * is a solution to ( P). Then
Proof -This is a direct consequence of Lemma 4.2 : the relation f (y ε , x ε ) ≤ f (y * , x * ) is obvious and the relation f (y * ,x ε ) ≤ f (y ε , x ε ) comes from the fact that y ε is a solution to (P ε ). 2
Remark 4.1 The previous lemmas show that it is sufficient to study
for somex ε ∈ S ε (y * ).
For a large class of realistic problems, the lower level is linearly constrained. moreover, we use for our analysis some local error bounds and these bounds are very complicated in case of nonlinear constraints. So, we assume from now on that C is polyhedral :
where A is a m × n real matrix and b ∈ R m .
In the sequel y * is a solution to ( P) (which existence is given by Theorem 3.1) and x * ∈ S(y * ) ( see (3.1)) so that
Let us denote
Note that β * is the optimal value for ( P) (the upper level) so that we may assume that β * = 0 (otherwise the problem is trivial). We set
Let us give an important property of C * :
Proposition 4.1 Assume y * is a solution to ( P) and C * is defined with (4.6) , then
Proof -Note that it impossible to get h(y * , x) ≤ α * , if x ∈ C * . Indeed, as x * ∈ S(y * ) then x * ∈ S(y * ) = argmin {h(y * , ζ) , ζ ∈ C} . Therefore :
The same remark holds for β * so that
Let us call
It is obvious that C * ⊂ C ′ . Conversely, let be x ∈ C ′ . Relation (4.7) yields α * ≤ h(y * , x) so that
This gives f (y * , x) ≤ β * . Similarly, we get h(y * , x) ≤ α * and x ∈ C * . 2
The main point is now to estimate (roughly speaking) the distance between the solution x * and S ε (y * ). As x * ∈ C * and C * is defined with inequalities, we first assume a Hoffman-type condition.
Error estimates under an Hoffman hypothesis
Following Azé and Corvellec [2] we know that
.
The notation [σ * < f (y * , ·) + h(y * , ·)] stands for the set
We note that [f (y * , ·) + h(y * , ·) ≤ σ * ] = C * . In this subsection, we assume the following
Let us call γ = 1 γ * : assumption (H 1 ) implies that
Note also that relation (4.4) of Lemma 4.3 yields that
because of the definition of S ε (y * ).Therefore
The existence of such Lipschitzian error bound for convex or general inequalities is, itself, an interesting domain of research. It is strongly related to metric regularity properties. A large number of conditions and characterizations can be found in [2, 3, 8, 9, 13, 15, 16] .
This list of references constitutes a small but significant part of the existent literature. 2. x * ε is the projection ofx ε on C * .
Lemma 4.4 Bothx ε ∈ S ε (y * ) and x * ε given by (4.10) converge to x * ∈ S(y * ) as ε → 0.
Proof -We know thatx ε → x * (with the previous results). Let us set d ε =x ε − x * ε ε . As d ε is bounded (by γ) it clear that x * ε andx ε have the same limit point (namely x * ). 2
In what followsx ε is an element of S ε (y * ) and x * ε is the associated element given by (4.10) .
Let us define
•
Asx ε ∈ S ε (y * ) and x * ε + εd ∈ C we have
As the functions are C 1 , we have
and 12) where ∇ x h stands for the derivative of h with respect to x. As x * ε ∈ C * andx ε ∈ C then
With relation (4.11) this gives
As d ε is bounded (by γ), there exist cluster points; passing to the limit gives
for any cluster pointd of the family d ε .
In addition, we obtain with (4.11) and (4.12)
Passing to the limit (with Lemma 4.4) we obtain
whered is a cluster point of the sequence d ε and any d ∈C. As d = 0 belongs toC, we get
Finally, we obtain with (4.13)
This means that
we get
As x * ε ∈ C * then h(y * , x * ε ) = α * and
As h and f 2 play similar roles we have the same result for f 2 . More precisely
We just proved the following result 
Proof -The first assertion has been proved : relations (4.16) and (4.17) . We use relation (4.4) and the previous result to claim that
As
and f (y * , x * ) + f (y ε , x ε ) → 2f (y * , x * ) = 2β * we get the result since β * = 0. 2
With a bootstrapping technique we obtain the following corollary ;
Corollary 4.1 Under the assumptions and notations of the previous theorem, we get
∀x ε ∈ S ε (y ε ) ∀n ∈ N f (y * , x * ) − f (y ε , x ε ) = o(ε n ) and ∀x ε ∈ S ε (y * ) h(y * ,x ε ) − h(y * , x * ) = o(ε n ) .
Proof -Using relations (4.16) and (4.17) in assumption (H 1 ) we see that relation (4.10) becomes ∀ε > 0, ∀x ε ∈ S ε (y * ) ∃x * ε ∈ C * s.t. x ε − x * ε ≤ γo(ε) . 
Error estimates under a "second-order" assumption
If assumption (H 1 ) is not ensured, one may, however, give estimates using the following hypothesis (H 2 ) ∃ε o > 0 , ∃δ > 0, such that ∀x ∈ C * + B(0, ε o ) ∃x ∈ C * such that x −x 2 ≤ δ (h(y * , x) − α * ) + + (f (y * , x) − β * ) We have a rather similar result which proof is the the same as in the previous subsection (so that we do not detail it) :
Theorem 4.2 Assume that (H 2 ) is satisfied ; let y ε be a solution to (P ε ) and x ε ∈ S ε (y ε ).
Then f (y * , x * ) − f (y ε , x ε ) = o( √ ε) as ε → 0 , so that
Moreover, ∀x ε ∈ S ε (y * )
∀τ > 0 h(y * ,x ε ) − h(y * , x * ) = o(ε 1−τ ) .
Conclusion
With this new penalization approach, the pessimistic formulation of general bi-level problems becomes, in some way, tractable. Indeed, instead of the complicated limit problem, we only need to solve approximately the penalized one for a small value of the parameter ε. We have given error estimates that prove that this approximation is reasonable even when Hoffman's assumption is not satisfied .
